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ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION AND 
THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS EXCEPTION TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE: FIX IT BEFORE PEOPLE FIND 
OUT ABOUT IT 
Daniel J. Capra 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2015) 
ABSTRACT 
The first website on the Internet was posted in 1991. While 
there is not much factual content on the earliest websites, it did 
not take long for factual assertions—easily retrievable today—to 
flood the Internet. Now, over one hundred billion emails are 
sent, and ten million static web pages are added to the Internet 
every day. In 2006 alone, the world produced electronic 
information that was equal to three million times the amount of 
information stored in every book ever written.  
The earliest innovations in electronic communication are 
now over twenty years old—meaning that the factual assertions 
made by way of these electronic media are potentially 
admissible for their truth at a trial if (and simply because) they 
were made more than twenty years ago. This is due to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(16), the so-called “ancient documents” 
exception to the hearsay rule. Under the ancient documents 
exception, documents that would normally be excluded as 
hearsay are admissible if the document is at least twenty years 
old, and if the party offering the document can show that the 
document is “genuine,” or authentic. As electronic 
communications continue to age, all of the factual assertions in 
terabytes of easily retrievable data will be potentially admissible 
for their truth simply because they are old. 
This Article argues that the ancient document exception 
needs to be changed because its rationale, while never very 
convincing in the first place, is simply invalid when applied to 
prevalent and retrievable electronically stored information 
(ESI). Part I of the Article discusses the rationales for the 
ancient documents rule and that exception’s relationship with 
the rules of authenticity on which it is based. Part II addresses 
whether the rationales for the ancient document exception, such 
                                                
  Reed Professor of Law at Fordham Law School and Reporter to the 
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. Thanks to 
Reyhan Watson and Amanda Weingarten for their excellent research 
assistance. 
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as they are, can be sensibly applied to ESI. Part III raises and 
answers some arguments against abrogating or restricting the 
ancient documents exception as applied to ESI or even more 
broadly. Part IV considers drafting alternatives for changing 
the ancient documents exception in light of its pending risk of 
use as a loophole for admitting unreliable ESI as evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The first website on the Internet was posted in 1991.1 While 
there is not much factual content on the very early websites, it 
did not take long for factual assertions—easily retrievable 
today—to flood the Internet. To take one example: the first 
easily retrievable web page of the National Enquirer tabloid 
containing assertive content is dated January 20, 1998 and can 
                                                
1  Daven Hiskey, The First Website Ever Made, TODAY I FOUND OUT, May 24, 
2010, http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2010/05/the-first-website-
ever-made (last visited Nov. 4, 2014, 7:06 pm). 
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be found on the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine.”2 On 
that webpage, the Enquirer asserts that Roseanne Barr and 
her baby were “nearly killed by [her] hubby” and that officers 
had to draw guns to save her life. The Enquirer webpage from 
January 30, 1998 asserts facts about the “Clinton Crisis”—
including an assertion impliedly attributed to Hillary Clinton 
that she “shared Monica with Bill.”3 Similarly outrageous 
assertions can easily be found in electronic text 
communications, which began in 1992,4 and emails, which were 
used as early as 1965.5 
All of these innovations in electronic communication are 
now over twenty years old—meaning that the factual 
assertions made by way of these electronic media are 
potentially admissible for their truth at a trial if (and simply 
because) they were made more than twenty years ago. This is 
due to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16), the so-called “ancient 
documents” exception to the hearsay rule. Under the ancient 
documents exception, a document that would normally be 
excluded as hearsay is admissible if the document is at least 
twenty years old and if the party offering the document can 
show that the document is “genuine,” or authentic.6  
It is probably fair to state that the threat of pervasive use of 
the ancient documents exception as applied to electronic 
information is not at crisis level right now because 
electronically stored information (ESI) did not become 
ubiquitous until somewhat less than twenty years ago. But it 
will not be long before all of the factual assertions in terabytes 
of easily retrievable data will be potentially admissible for their 
truth simply because they are old.7 For example, the Wayback 
                                                
2 National Enquirer, Jan. 20, 1998, WAYBACK MACHINE, http://web.archive 
.org/web/19980120010422/http://nationalenquirer.com (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014). Another example of a website that allows users to access archival 
copies of webpages is www.cachedpages.org, which allows users to employ 
one interface to search three different archival services—the Wayback 
Machine, Google Cache, and Coral Cache. 
3  Clinton Crisis: Breaking News, NATIONAL ENQUIRER, Jan. 30, 1998, 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/19980130025606/http://www.nat 
ionalenquirer.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
4  Kyle Russel, The First Text Message Ever Was Sent 21 Years Ago Today, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-first-
text-message-ever-2013-12. 
5  Ian Peter, The History of Email, NET HISTORY, http://www.nethistory 
.info/History%20of%20the%20Internet/email.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014). 
6  FED. R. EVID. 803(16).  
7  For convenience, “old” in this article means more than 20 years old—i.e., 
old enough to trigger the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule.  
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Machine allows easy retrieval of over 398 billion web pages.8 In 
1998, there were approximately 47 million email users in the 
United States, sending a total of 182.5 billion emails per year.9 
The amount of electronically stored information has been 
doubling or tripling every eighteen to twenty-four months.10 In 
2011, the digital universe contained 1800 exabytes of 
information, enough data to fill 57.5 billion 32GB Apple 
iPads.11 In 2006 alone, the world produced electronic 
information that was equal to three million times the amount 
of information stored in every book ever written.12 Over one 
hundred billion emails are sent each day.13 Ten million static 
web pages are added to the Internet every day.14 Most of this 
information will never make it to a piece of paper. 
Up until now, the ancient documents rule has been a sleepy 
little exception applied to hardcopy information. In the almost 
forty years of practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
ancient documents exception has been invoked in less than one 
hundred reported cases. Conversations that I have had with 
(not-to-be-named) judges indicate that many are unaware that 
the exception even exists. It is fair to state that, at this point, 
the ancient document exception is not on the radar for most 
                                                
8 Don MacLeod, iWitness: Archival Research, 40 LITIG., no. 4, 2014, at 18. 
9 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST 
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., July 2005 
ed.).  
10 Gil Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES, May 9, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-of-
big-data (noting that data was estimated to double every eighteen months 
between 2006 and 2010 based on projected growth rates). 
11 Rich Miller, ‘Digital Universe’ to Add 1.8 Zettabytes in 2011, DATA CENTER 
KNOWLEDGE, June 28, 2011, http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/arch 
ives/2011/06/28/digital-universe-to-add-1-8-zettabytes-in-2011; see JOHN 
GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, INT'L DATA CORP., STATE OF THE UNIVERSE: AN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-rep 
orts/idc-extracting-value-from-chaos-ar.pdf (explaining the significance of 
the expansion of the digital universe). The IDC website states the data in 
terms of zettabytes. Id. One zettabyte is equal to one thousand exabytes. 
Zettabyte, SEARCHSTORAGE, http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition 
/zettabyte. This article uses exabytes for consistency (last visited Mar. 29, 
2015). 
12  JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., INT'L DATA CORP., THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE 
1 (2007), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-
idc-white-paper.pdf. 
13  THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2013-2017, at 3 
(2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Sta 
tistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
14  Jason R. Baron & Ralph C. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE 
(Feb. 11, 2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M. 
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lawyers or judges. This is surely because the likelihood of 
finding a hardcopy document that is twenty years old and also 
relevant to an existing litigation is quite small.  
But that can change now that much ESI has reached, if not 
surpassed, the twenty-year mark. It has been said that ESI 
“surrounds us like an ever-deepening fog or an overwhelming 
flood.”15 The question is whether anything should be done 
about the ancient documents exception before that exception—
and its applicability to ESI—are discovered by lawyers and 
judges. The potential problem is that ESI might be stored 
without much trouble for twenty years, and the sheer volume of 
it could end up flooding the courts with unreliable hearsay, 
through an exception that would be applied much more broadly 
than the drafters (or the common law) saw coming in the days 
of paper. Examples include self-serving emails from a business, 
tweets and texts about events from people who were not at the 
event, web postings accusing individuals of misconduct, and 
anonymous blog posts. And while it is true that the twenty-
year time period will serve as a limit to admissibility in some 
cases, there are many plausible examples of old ESI that will 
be relevant—in criminal cases, many serious crimes are no 
longer limited by statutes of limitations; and in civil cases such 
as antitrust and environmental cases, the long-term nature of 
the wrong may well be shown (or not shown) by old ESI.16 
This Article argues that the ancient document exception 
needs to be changed because its rationale, while never very 
convincing in the first place, is simply invalid when applied to 
prevalent and retrievable ESI. Part I of the Article will discuss 
the rationales for the ancient documents rule and that 
exception’s relationship with the rules of authenticity on which 
it is based. Part II will address whether the rationales for the 
ancient document exception, such as they are, can be sensibly 
applied to ESI. Part III will raise and answer some arguments 
                                                
15  DAVID ROBERT MATTHEWS, ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION: THE 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT, UNDERSTANDING, ACQUISITION, 
STORAGE, SEARCH, AND RETRIEVAL 81 (2013). On the prevalence of ESI, see 
Martin Hilbert & Priscila Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity to 
Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCI. 60, 62 (2011) 
(“The total amount of information grew from 2.6 optimally compressed 
exabytes in 1986 to 15.8 in 1993, over 54.5 in 2000, and to 295 optimally 
compressed exabytes in 2007. This is equivalent to less than one 730-MB 
CD-ROM per person in 1986 (539 MB per person), roughly 4 CD-ROM per 
person of 1993, 12 CD-ROM per person in the year 2000, and almost 61 
CD-ROM per person in 2007. Piling up the imagined 404 billion CD-ROM 
from 2007 would create a stack from the earth to the moon and a quarter 
of this distance beyond (with 1.2 mm thickness per CD)). 
16  See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.  
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against abrogating or restricting the ancient documents 
exception as applied to ESI or even more broadly. Part IV will 
consider drafting alternatives for changing the ancient 
documents exception in light of its pending risk of use as a 
loophole for admitting unreliable ESI as evidence. 
I. THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS RULE—AUTHENTICITY 
RULE AND HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
The ancient documents “rule” is actually comprised of two 
rules. One is a rule on authenticity, which provides standards 
for qualifying an old document as genuine. The other is a 
hearsay exception for all statements contained in an authentic 
ancient document. These rules are derived from the common 
law, although the relevant time period has been reduced from 
thirty years in the common law to twenty years in the current 
rules.17  
Rule 901(b)(8) provides as an example of evidence satisfying 
the standards of authenticity a document or “data compilation” 
that “(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its 
authenticity; (B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would 
likely be; and (C) is at least twenty years old when offered.”18 
The idea behind the rule is plain: if something has been found 
in a likely place after more than twenty years, the chances of it 
being a fake are sufficiently small that its genuineness becomes 
a matter for the jury to consider. As the Advisory Committee 
puts it, the rationale for Rule 901(b)(8) is “the unlikeliness of a 
still viable fraud after the lapse of time.”19 The standard for 
establishing authenticity to the court is low—a showing 
sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that the document 
is what the proponent says it is.20 Under that low standard, if a 
                                                
17  See FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note (citing common law 
basis for the hearsay exception that stems from the rule on authenticity); 
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note (adopting the “familiar 
ancient document rule of the common law”). The Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 901(b)(8) attempts to explain the shortening of the time 
period from thirty to twenty years as a “shift of emphasis from the 
probable unavailability of witnesses to the unlikeliness of a still viable 
fraud after the lapse of time” and concedes that any time period “is bound 
to be arbitrary.” Id. 
18  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).  
19  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note. 
20  See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (“the 
burden of proof for authentication is slight”); United States v. Holmquist, 
36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1994) (“the standard for authentication, and 
hence for admissibility, is one of reasonable likelihood”); United States v. 
Coohey, 11 F.3d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1993) (“the proponent need only 
demonstrate a rational basis for its claim that the evidence is what the 
proponent asserts it to be”). 
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document looks old and not suspicious, and is found where it 
ought to be, it makes sense to leave the question of authenticity 
to the jury.21  
 But as the Advisory Committee noted, finding a document 
to be authentic is different from finding the assertions in that 
document to be reliable. Authenticity is a question of whether 
the item offered is what the proponent says it is—for example, 
that an email purportedly written by a person was actually 
written by that person. Reliability is a question of whether the 
assertions in a genuine item are in fact true—and that is the 
concern of the hearsay rule.22 As the Committee put it, “since 
most of these items are significant inferentially only insofar as 
they are assertive, their admission in evidence must be as a 
hearsay exception.”23 To address the hearsay issue, the drafters 
included a hearsay exception, Rule 803(16), which provides 
that “[a] statement in a document that is at least 20 years old 
and whose authenticity has been established” is admissible 
despite the fact that it is hearsay.24 
Professors Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick set 
forth the most complete articulation of the rationale for the 
ancient documents hearsay exception: 
Need is the main justification. The lapse 
of 20 years since the acts, events or conditions 
described almost guarantees a shortage of 
evidence. Witnesses will have died or 
disappeared. Written statements that might fit 
other exceptions (business records, past 
                                                
21  Rule 901(b)(8) is not, however, the only avenue for authenticating an 
ancient document and thus triggering the ancient documents exception to 
the hearsay rule. Rule 803(16) says that the statements in a document 
that is at least twenty years old and whose “authenticity is established” 
are admissible for their truth. “Authenticity is established” means 
established in any way. FED. R. EVID. 803(16). Thus, as will be discussed 
below, the tried and true methods for authenticating ESI in general are 
fully applicable to authenticating twenty-year-old ESI. 
22  See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.13 (10th ed. 2012) (“The 
hearsay rule is designed to exclude a certain type of unreliable evidence. 
Hearsay is presumptively unreliable because when an out-of-court 
statement is offered for its truth, it is only probative if the person who 
made the statement—the declarant—was telling the truth. But the 
truthfulness of an out-of-court declarant cannot be assessed by the 
ordinary methods with which we determine the truth of testimonial 
evidence—oath, cross-examination, and the factfinder’s scrutiny of the 
witness’s demeanor.”).  
23  FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note. 
24  FED. R. EVID. 803(16). 
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recollection) are typically thrown out or lost or 
destroyed25 . . . .   
Naturally, statements in ancient 
documents are affected by risks of misperception, 
faulty memory, ambiguity, and lack of candor 
(they are not intrinsically more reliable than oral 
statements), and a written statement unreliable 
when made is unreliable forever. Ancient 
documents do, however, bring fewer risks of 
misreporting (because the document is in 
writing),26 and they bring at least some 
assurance against negative influences: When 
authenticated, an ancient document leaves little 
doubt that the statement was made; there is 
little risk of errors in transmission; because of its 
age, the document is not likely to have suffered 
from the forces generating the suit, so there is 
less reason to fear distortion or lack of candor.27 
If a document satisfies the authenticity requirements of 
Rule 901(b)(8) or satisfies any other ground of authentication 
provided in Rules 901 or 902, and is over twenty years old,28 
then every statement in that document can be admitted for its 
truth. That is so because Rule 803(16) simply equates 
authenticity of the document with admissibility of the hearsay 
statements in that document. The rule does not purport 
                                                
25  Whether the assertion of Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick is applicable 
when the old material is ESI will be discussed in Part III, infra.  
26  Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s reliance on a writing as a guarantee of 
reliability is in fact misplaced. The problem that the hearsay rule 
addresses is that there is an out-of-court declarant who may be unreliable 
and cannot be cross-examined. The reporting of the statement is not a 
hearsay problem because the person reporting is on the stand subject to 
cross-examination. Therefore it does not matter, for purposes of the 
hearsay rule, whether the statement is oral or written. That is to say, 
whether the statement was made is not a hearsay problem; the hearsay 
problem is about whether the statement is true.  
27  CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
8:100 (4th ed. 2013); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s 
note (arguing that “age affords assurance that the writing antedates the 
present controversy”). 
28  As noted above, the ancient documents hearsay exception does not require 
the document to be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(8); it can be 
authenticated in any way. So, for example, a twenty-year-old domestic 
public document under seal is self-authenticating under Rule 902(1). 
Thus, the statements in the document would escape the hearsay bar 
without the need of the proponent to show authenticity under Rule 
901(b)(8). 
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specifically to regulate the reliability of the contents of an 
ancient document through some circumstantial guarantee, 
even though other hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 are grounded 
in circumstantial guarantees of reliability.29 While the 
Advisory Committee obliquely states, “age affords assurance 
that the writing antedates the present controversy,” there is no 
admissibility requirement in the rule that, in fact, the 
statements must predate the controversy.30 As the court put it 
in Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., “Once a 
document qualifies as an ancient document, it is automatically 
excepted from the hearsay rule under Fed. R. Evid. 803(16).”31 
Consequently, the Threadgill court reversed a trial court’s 
ruling that excluded an ancient document because the content 
was untrustworthy.32  
Rule 803(16) is the only rule of evidence that equates 
authenticity with admissibility of hearsay.33 It is a curious 
assumption that, just because an old document is authentic, 
                                                
29  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (outlining a hearsay exception for 
statements made for purposes of medical treatment based on 
circumstantial guarantees of reliability inherent in obtaining medical 
treatment, and on the fact that the statement must be pertinent to the 
doctor’s treatment or diagnosis); FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (outlining a hearsay 
exception for statements made in the course of regularly conducted 
activity based on circumstantial guarantees of reliability inherent in 
regular recording of regularly conducted activity).  
30  FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note. 
31  928 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3d Cir. 1991).  
32  A qualification to the rule of broad admissibility in text does arise if the 
ancient document itself refers to a hearsay statement—e.g., an old diary 
entry stating that “The defendant just sent me a letter in which he 
confessed to robbing my store.” The hearsay exception would cover the fact 
that the diarist received a letter, but whether the defendant actually 
confessed to the robbery would have to be handled by another exception—
in this case that would be a party-opponent statement, FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2). In other words, the ancient documents exception does not 
abrogate the rule on multiple hearsay imposed by Rule 805—at least in 
the view of right-thinking courts. See, e.g., United States v. Hajda, 135 
F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the ancient documents exception 
“applies only to the document itself,” and that “[i]f the document contains 
more than one level of hearsay, an appropriate exception must be found 
for each level”). For more on the ancient documents exception and 
multiple hearsay, see Gregg Kettles, Ancient Documents and the Rule 
Against Multiple Hearsay, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 719 (1999) (arguing 
that the ancient documents exception is subject to the rule on multiple 
hearsay, but noting the split of authority). 
33  See Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 906 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Because 
of the hearsay rule, authentication as a genuine ERCO document would 
not generally suffice to admit the contents of that document for its truth. 
One exception is when documents are authenticated as ancient documents 
under Rule 901(b)(8), in which case they automatically fall within the 
ancient document exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(16).”). 
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the statements in it are automatically reliable enough to escape 
the rule excluding hearsay. Despite the Advisory Committee’s 
assertion that the “danger of mistake is minimized by 
authentication requirements,”34 none of the guarantees for 
authenticity set forth in Rule 901(b)(8) or any other 
authenticity rule do anything to assure that the statements in 
the authentic document are reliable. As the Seventh Circuit 
aptly put it in United States v. Kairys, the authentication rule’s 
requirement that a proffered document be free of suspicion 
“goes not to the content of the document, but rather to whether 
the document is what it purports to be.”35 For example, a 
twenty-year-old National Enquirer, kept in an archivist’s 
study, will be found authentic—but should that mean that 
every single statement in the Enquirer about Michael Jackson, 
or alien invasions, should be admissible for its truth? 
Indeed, that would follow from the Advisory Committee’s 
assertion that any authentic document should be admissible for 
the truth of its assertions. Yet the Advisory Committee gives no 
indication of why the danger of unreliable assertions is 
minimized by authentication requirements for ancient 
documents but not for any other documents or statements. The 
Advisory Committee’s assertion is especially weak given the 
fact that a statement in an ancient document is admissible for 
its truth even if the document is authenticated in some way 
other than under Rule 901(b)(8)—Rule 803(16) simply states 
that a statement is admissible whenever authenticity “is 
established.”36 It follows that there is apparently nothing about 
the authenticity requirements of Rule 901(b)(8) in particular 
that warrant an assumption of the reliability of statements in 
an ancient document; so why not throw out the hearsay rule 
whenever any document is authenticated? The answer is plain: 
the policy of the hearsay rule is to exclude unreliable out-of-
court assertions,37 and that policy is not sufficiently 
furthered—indeed it is ignored—if the only standard for 
admissibility is that the document itself is genuine.  
A further anomaly of the ancient documents hearsay 
exception is inherent in its bright-line nature. For example, a 
copy of the National Enquirer that is 19 years and 364 days old 
could be authenticated,38 but none of the assertions in that 
                                                
34  FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note. 
35  782 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1986). 
36  FED. R. EVID. 803(16). 
37  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 
958 (1974) (noting that hearsay is subject to “testimonial infirmities” that 
can render it unreliable).  
38  See FED. R. EVID. 902(6) (material purporting to be a newspaper or 
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Enquirer would be automatically admissible for their truth. 
The equation of authenticity and hearsay admissibility occurs 
the second that the periodical becomes twenty-years-old. 
Perhaps it is true, as the Advisory Committee concedes, that 
“[a]ny time period selected is bound to be arbitrary.”39 But that 
assertion only begs a number of questions. First, why is an 
arbitrary time period the correct solution to either authenticity 
or reliability? Given that the basis for an ancient documents 
rule lies somewhere among the principles of necessity and lack 
of motive to fabricate a document for litigation so far down the 
road, why not articulate those policies as a textual standard of 
admissibility? An arbitrary time period is an inexact surrogate 
for the policies that appear to underline the ancient document 
rules.  
Second, even if a statutory time period is used, why use it 
in such a binary fashion? Why not, for example, apply more or 
less stringent standards of admissibility whenever a document 
falls on one side or the other of the line? For example, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 609(b) contains a ten-year time period 
applicable to impeaching a witness with a prior conviction.40 
But while the time period is arbitrary, the Rule does not 
arbitrarily state that a conviction is admissible if falling on one 
side of the timeline and inadmissible if it falls on the other. In 
contrast to Rule 803(16), Rule 609(b) provides for a less 
generous rule of admissibility if the conviction falls on the “old” 
side of the line. An analogous solution for Rule 803(16) that 
would avoid the irrationality of a statement inadmissible on 
one day but admissible for its truth on another would be to 
provide a different, somewhat more generous, rule of 
admissibility for the “old” statement. But Rule 803(16) makes 
no such effort.  
In the end, Rule 803(16) is a radical and irrational hearsay 
exception—an error of the common law that was adopted and 
indeed exacerbated by the original Advisory Committee’s 
reduction of the time period necessary to trigger it. The original 
Advisory Committee did not provide a convincing explanation 
for equating authenticity of a document and the reliability of 
its contents—no explanation can be found in the legislative 
                                                                                                         
periodical is self-authenticating). 
39  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note.  
40  Rule 609(b) provides that “if more than 10 years have passed since the 
witness’s conviction or release from confinement” evidence of the 
conviction may be admitted to impeach the witness only if “its probative 
value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect” and proper notice is provided. FED. R. 
EVID. 609(b). 
 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 17 
 
12 
history other than the Advisory Committee Note’s assertion 
that statements predating litigation are more likely to be 
reliable.  
But if the rule is so misguided, why has the modern 
Advisory Committee not done something about it?  
The answer, I believe, is that Rule 803(16) has flown under 
the radar because it is so rarely invoked.41 A Westlaw search 
indicates that ancient documents have been admitted in fewer 
than one hundred reported cases since the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were enacted.42 Of course, it is not possible to 
determine how often the exception has been used in unreported 
cases, but it is fair to state that judges do not invoke the 
exception very often.  
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has always 
taken a conservative approach to proposing amendments to the 
Evidence Rules. Amendments are costly because experienced 
litigators and judges need to know the rules that exist, often 
without having the luxury of referring to a book. Any change to 
those rules imposes dislocation costs on litigators, judges, and 
the legal system as a whole—so the change had better be worth 
it. For example, in 2003, the Justice Department sought to 
amend Rule 410 to provide that statements made by a 
prosecutor during plea negotiations could not be admissible 
against the government if the defendant ended up going to 
trial;43 as written, the Rule protects statements made by the 
defendant in plea negotiations, but not those made by the 
government.44 The rationale for the proposed change was that 
Rule 410 is intended to encourage uninhibited plea 
negotiations, and that this goal would be maximized by 
protecting the statements of both sides. While the Department 
of Justice seemed to propose a worthy and sensible change, the 
Advisory Committee refused to pursue it, as indicated in the 
minutes of the Spring 2004 meeting: 
[A] number of questions and concerns were 
raised about the merits of the draft amendment 
                                                
41  The fact that the ancient documents exception was a backwater exception 
might well explain the original Advisory Committee’s relative lack of 
concern about it. But the problem addressed by this Article is that the 
prevalence of ESI has destroyed the original “backwater” premise. 
42  In contrast, for example, state of mind statements have been admitted 
under Rule 803(3) in around 900 published cases. Searches for “803(16)” 
and “803(3)” conducted on Oct. 1, 2014. 
43  Minutes of the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 10-13, Nov. 
13, 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minut 
es/1103EVMin.pdf. 
44  See FED. R. EVID. 410.  
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to Rule 410. The most important objection was 
that the amendment did not appear necessary, 
because [every reported case has] held that a 
statement or offer made by a prosecutor in a plea 
negotiation [is inadmissible] against the 
government as an admission of the weakness of 
the government’s case . . . . [n]otwithstanding the 
questionable reasoning [sometimes used to reach 
this result] . . . . 
. . . .  
Given . . . the fact that the courts are 
reaching fair and uniform results under the 
current rules . . . members of the Committee 
questioned whether the benefits of an 
amendment to Rule 410 would outweigh the 
costs. The Committee ultimately concluded that 
Rule 410 was not “broken,” and therefore that 
the costs of a “fix” are not justified.45 
If the goal is to propose amendments only when necessary 
to remedy a real problem, it is understandable that the 
Advisory Committee has not yet chosen to amend a rule that 
many litigators and judges have never used or even thought 
about. But now that terabytes and zettabytes46 of information 
are reaching or have already reached a twentieth birthday, the 
committee should rethink the ancient documents exception. In 
other words, data overload is already, or soon will be, a real 
problem worth fixing. 
This new concern about the possible overuse of the ancient 
documents hearsay exception has not gone unnoticed by the 
Advisory Committee. The Committee is currently considering 
whether the use of ESI warrants amending Rule 803(16) to 
avoid abuse of that exception.47 
                                                
45  Minutes of the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 11-12, Apr. 
29-30, 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Min 
utes/EV04-2004.pdf. 
46  See Sridhar Pappu, To Handle the Big Data Deluge, HP Plots a Giant 
Leap Forward, HP MATTER, June 2014, https://ssl.www8.hp.com/hpmatter 
/issue-no-1-june-2014/handle-big-data-deluge-hp-plots-giant-leap-forward 
(explaining how much data exists in the world). 
47  See Agenda for Committee Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 
5, Apr. 4, 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules 
/AgendaBooks/Evidence/EV2014-04.pdf (displaying “Possible Amendment 
to Rule 803(16)” as an agenda item). 
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II. DOES THE RATIONALE FOR THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS 
EXCEPTION APPLY TO ESI? 
It can certainly be argued that if the rationale of the 
ancient documents exception is enough to support admissibility 
of hardcopy, then it is enough to support the admissibility of 
ESI. That argument begins with the observation that the 
original Advisory Committee was aware of the existence of 
electronic information and sought in some way to accommodate 
it within the ancient documents rule. Rule 901(b)(8)—which as 
stated above is an authenticity-based rule that provides a 
gateway for admissibility under the hearsay exception—
specifically covers an old “data compilation” that is in 
suspicion-free condition and found in a suspicion-free place. 
However right or wrong the Advisory Committee was about 
ancient documents’ admissibility, the Committee decided to 
treat electronic information the same as hardcopy for purposes 
of authenticity.48 The fact that the Advisory Committee foresaw 
and accommodated ESI in the authenticity rule arguably 
counsels caution in trying to rethink the ancient document 
rule.  
But even though consideration of a question by the original 
Advisory Committee is surely relevant to the merits of an 
amendment, it is not as clear that the original Advisory 
Committee thought much about the risk to the hearsay rule 
that might be found in the explosion of ESI. It is notable that 
Rule 901(b)(8) specifically mentions data compilations and Rule 
803(16) does not. Given the vast rate of data growth, it is likely 
that the Advisory Committee was not explicitly thinking of the 
possibility that terabytes upon terabytes of information would 
become admissible for their truth simply because that 
information was stored in a server for twenty years.49 Indeed, 
                                                
48  See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note (“The familiar 
ancient document rule of the common law is extended to include data 
stored electronically or by other similar means . . . . This expansion is 
necessary in view of the widespread use of methods of storing data in 
forms other than conventional written records.”). 
49  It should be noted that any argument based on the omission of a reference 
to ESI in Rule 803(16) is weakened by the fact that after the restyling of 
the Evidence Rules in 2011, Rule 803(16) can now in fact be plausibly read 
to cover ESI. This is because the new Rule 101(b)(6) provides that “a 
reference to any kind of written material . . . includes electronically stored 
information.” Thus the reference to a “document” in Rule 803(16) would 
appear to have been, so to speak, “electrified” by the restyling. The 
counter to that argument is that, as emphasized in the Committee Notes 
to the restyling, no change in the substance of any rule was made or 
intended. See FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to 2011 
Amendments; FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 2011 
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the proliferation of ESI shows that taking a hands-off approach 
to a rule of evidence simply because the Advisory Committee 
thought the rule was a good idea several decades ago ignores 
relevant changes that take place over time.50 
The question, then, is whether the explosion of electronic 
information has separated ESI from the original justifications 
for the hearsay exception for ancient documents. As stated 
above, the primary justification for the ancient documents 
exception is necessity, which comes down to the premise that it 
is likely that all reliable evidence (such as business records) 
has been destroyed within the twenty-year time period, and 
thus we have to make do with more dubious evidence. This 
necessity assumption is substantially undermined by the 
growth of ESI. Because ESI is prevalent51 and easily preserved, 
whatever reliable evidence existed at the time of a twenty-year-
old event probably still exists. Indeed, the probability that most 
or all ESI records (emails, text messages, receipts, scanned 
documents, etc.) will be available is certainly higher than the 
probability that hardcopy documents or eyewitnesses will still 
be available and useful several decades after a contested 
event.52 There is no reason to admit unreliable ESI on necessity 
grounds if it is quite likely that there will be reliable ESI that 
is admissible under other hearsay exceptions.53 Thus the 
                                                                                                         
Amendments. 
50 The Supreme Court often finds the Advisory Committee’s opinions 
persuasive. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (establishing a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Federal common law, a decision 
“reinforced” by the fact that such a privilege was included in the list of 
privileges that the original Advisory Committee sent to Congress). But 
that does not mean those opinions are always controlling. See, e.g., Green 
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) (noting that original 
Rule 609(a)(1), as written, led to an anomalous result in civil cases and 
therefore “can’t mean what it says.”). And it especially does not mean that 
the Advisory Committee has always been able to predict the changes in 
society and technology that might justify a change to the Evidence Rules.  
51  See Ronald J. Hedges, Daniel Riesel, Donald W. Stever & Kenneth J. 
Withers, Taking Shape: E-Discovery Practices Under the Federal Rules, 
SN085 ALI-ABA 289, 292 (2008) (“According to a University of California 
study, 93 percent of all information generated during 1999 was generated 
in digital form, on computers. Only 7 percent of information originated in 
other media, such as paper.”); see also David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery 
Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (showing that, of an estimated 
5.6 million terabytes of data stored in 2002, 5.18 million terabytes were 
stored electronically and an additional 420,000 were stored on film). 
52  Challenges to the premise that old ESI is actually preserved/accessible 
will be discussed in the next Part.  
53  See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. International Media Films Inc., No. 
CV 11-09112 SJO (AJWx), 2013 WL 3215189 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) 
(finding that records regarding a film, more than twenty years old, were 
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“necessity” of proving claims based on older information of 
whatever provenance has been and will be answered by the 
existence of bytes upon bytes of reliable electronic 
information—information that was not or could not have been 
preserved further in the past. If the ancient documents 
exception remains as is, the legal system will face a situation in 
which parties can freely admit unreliable ESI just because it is 
old notwithstanding the existence of prevalent, reliable 
alternative evidence. 
But there is another (lesser) justification for the exception 
that needs to be addressed—that an old statement has some 
indicium of reliability due to the fact that it was made before 
any litigation motive could have arisen. That justification is not 
completely without merit, and it would seem to apply to ESI as 
much as it applies to hardcopy. But there are a number of 
counterarguments.  
First, the fact that a statement was made before a specific 
conflict arose does not mean it did not have some litigation 
motive. For example, take a case in which a plaintiff is suing a 
major corporation for employment discrimination. The 
defendant wants to admit twenty-year-old text messages from 
the plaintiff’s previous employer, casting aspersions on the 
plaintiff’s work. It is certainly possible that such messages, if 
true, could be probative to prove the employer’s lack of intent 
to discriminate, or for some other non-propensity purpose.54 
But as to hearsay—whether the activity even occurred—the 
statements may well have been made under the previous 
employer’s own litigation motive at the time.  
Another common example of old evidence made under a 
non-specific litigation motive is that of documents produced in 
an environmental cleanup action under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
                                                                                                         
admissible as business records). At the very least, the threat of rampant 
use of old and unreliable ESI should lead to an adjustment of the Rule to 
include something like the necessity language of Fed. R. Evid. 807—
requiring that the proffered evidence is more probative than any other 
evidence reasonably available. One of the drafting alternatives infra 
considers this possibility. 
54  See, e.g., Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding 
admissible evidence of the employer’s activity toward other employees to 
establish modus operandi); Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 
2008) (holding that evidence of plaintiff’s long-running participation in a 
race discrimination class action should have been admitted as probative of 
employer’s retaliatory intent); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 131 F.3d 647 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (finding admissible evidence of racial graffiti at employer’s 
plant and racially offensive conduct toward African-American workers to 
prove discriminatory intent even if not directed toward the plaintiff). 
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1980 (CERCLA), which imposes liability for cleanup costs on 
any company that deposits hazardous materials at a place 
covered by the statute.55 The statute of limitations for a cost 
recovery action under CERCLA runs from the day the plaintiff 
performed certain acts to clean up the contamination, which 
could be decades after the materials were deposited.56 It is 
more than plausible to believe that a party would generate self-
serving documents in anticipation of the possibility of some 
CERCLA action far in the future. Another obvious example is 
mass tort litigation stemming from hazardous substances. The 
time differential here arises from a combination of latency 
periods for the risks and the lengthiness of the proceedings. 
But, as is seen in tobacco litigation, the litigation motive can 
exist at the time a document is prepared even if the litigation 
potential is far in the future.57  
Given the sheer volume of old ESI, it is apparent that some 
old ESI will have been made with a litigation motive of some 
kind—and yet this ESI would be automatically admissible 
under an unamended Rule 803(16) simply because it is old. It is 
important to note that the existing Rule does not require that 
the document actually have been prepared before a controversy 
arose. The Advisory Committee assumed there would be no 
litigation motive affecting old documents, but did not require a 
finding of lack of motive in the text of the rule.58 Given docket 
                                                
55  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (West 2014).  
56  CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (establishing statutory period 
running from “initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial 
action”). Indeed, a good percentage of reported cases applying the ancient 
documents exception to hardcopy are CERCLA actions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Atlas Lederer Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding 
hardcopy customer documentation regarding a battery disposal site 
inadmissible as business records but admissible as ancient documents); 
Reichhold Chem. Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995) 
(offering ancient documents in opposition to an affirmative defense to 
CERCLA liability). 
57 See, e.g., Rule 803(16): Ancient Documents, 15 FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE NEWS 90-177, 90-189 (1990) (“The phenomenon of docket delays 
as well as the frequent litigation of liability arising from health 
detriments that may take decades to come about may be giving new life to 
the neglected ‘ancient documents' hearsay exception.”). 
58  See, e.g., Langbord v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Civil Action No. 06-5315, 
2011 WL 2623315, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 5, 2011) (“Requiring courts to 
ignore the ancient document rule's three requirements and make 
determinations based on whether a document was prepared with similar 
litigation in mind would require courts to assess a document's 
trustworthiness or bias, a task inappropriate when resolving threshold 
authenticity questions.”); Columbia First Bank v. United States, 58 Fed. 
Cl. 333 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (finding no requirement in the rule that the 
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delays and the lengthiness of disputes endemic to certain kinds 
of large cases, it would not be surprising that ESI could have 
been prepared more than twenty years earlier for the specific 
dispute before the court.59 
Second, even if an absence of litigation motive might exist 
for a particular ancient document, that would be the only 
reliability-based factor supporting admissibility for hearsay 
admitted under Rule 803(16). No other hearsay exception relies 
solely on the absence of litigation motive in establishing the 
reliability required for admission of hearsay. Hearsay 
statements are excluded every day even though they are made 
without a litigation motive. Take as an example a statement of 
an unaffiliated bystander to an accident, made the day after 
the accident, indicating that the defendant-driver was at fault. 
That statement is inadmissible hearsay even if the declarant is 
unavailable at trial. There is no reliability-based justification 
for admitting the same statement simply because the event is 
twenty years old. The basic position of the hearsay rule and its 
other exceptions—that absence of litigation motive is relevant 
but not dispositive for determining admissibility of hearsay—
makes eminent sense because many out-of-court statements 
are demonstrably unreliable, even if made without litigation 
motive. Personal animosities, rampant misperceptions, and 
just plain willingness to lie can impair the reliability of an out-
of-court statement even if the declarant made it with no 
upcoming litigation.  
Third, the thin reed of (possible) reliability based on 
absence of litigation motive might once have been tolerable 
because the ancient documents exception was rarely used. But 
again, that is likely to change with the advent of ESI. It is 
surely the case that lawyers will seek to use the exception more 
frequently to admit stored ESI for its truth.60 Establishing 
admissibility under 803(16) is likely to be easier than, for 
example, using the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule.61 That exception, Rule 803(6), requires foundation 
testimony or an affidavit from a knowledgeable witness, as well 
                                                                                                         
document must actually antedate the controversy). 
59 See Osprey Ship Management, Inc. v. Jackson County Port Authority, 
Civil No. 1:05CV390-HSO-RHW, 2008 WL 282267 (SD. Miss. Jan. 29, 
2008) (finding admissible as an ancient document an affidavit prepared 
earlier in a lengthy dispute). 
60 G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, 
62 UMKC. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (predicting that the ancient documents 
exception “will be applied more frequently and more frequently it will be 
applied to prove essential elements of the case.”). 
61  FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
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as a showing that the record is one of regularly conducted 
activity.62 Other exceptions, such as for excited utterances and 
present sense impressions, contain their own detailed 
admissibility requirements.63 In contrast, all that needs to be 
shown for an ancient document is that it is old enough and 
meets the low standards for authenticity (a requirement that 
must be met for any document).64 For ESI, age will be simple to 
establish because the information will be dated in the 
metadata.65 Indeed, the metadata attendant to a file will make 
it easier to show that it has not (or has) been suspiciously 
altered—thus making the authentication question that is the 
basis for the hearsay exception easier to solve than with 
hardcopy. In sum, while we once might have been able to 
tolerate the fallacy of the ancient documents exception—that 
authenticity establishes reliability of content—the prospect of 
more frequent use due to the prevalence of ESI requires more 
attention to the reliability of old information.  
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN AMENDMENT TO RULE 
803(16) 
This Article has hopefully made the case that the ancient 
documents exception to the hearsay rule is based on the faulty 
assumption that the authenticity of a document justifies 
admitting all of its contents for their truth—an assumption 
                                                
62 See, e.g., United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(finding a record inadmissible as a business record because it was not 
prepared in the regular course of business activity, but admissible under 
Rule 803(16)). 
63 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (stating that to be admissible as a present sense 
impression, the statement must have been made at the time of the event 
to be proved, or immediately thereafter, and must describe the event); 
FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (stating that to be admissible as an excited utterance, 
the statement must have been made by the declarant while under the 
influence of a startling event, and it must relate to that event). 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Kalymon, 541 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“Suspicion does not go to the [factual] content of the document,” when 
considering whether the ancient document exception applies, but instead, 
“to whether the document is what it purports to be.”); United States v. 
Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding an ancient document 
admissible even though it would not satisfy any reliability-based hearsay 
exception). 
65 Metadata is information about data that is not readily apparent on the 
screen view of the file. “Metadata includes information about the 
document or file that is recorded by the computer to assist in storing and 
retrieving the document or file . . . . [Metadata] includes file designation, 
create and edit dates, authorship, comments, and edit history.” SHIRA A. 
SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (2d ed. 
2012). 
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that is problematically triggered by an arbitrary up-or-down 
time period. The Article has argued that the prevalence of ESI 
has led to a tipping point where we can no longer allow the 
exception to operate the way it has. But all that said, there are 
a number of counterarguments to amending Rule 803(16).  
A. How Prevalent and Retrievable Is Old ESI? 
The two primary arguments for an amendment to Rule 
803(16) are: (1) courts are going to be overrun with unreliable 
old ESI; and (2) the necessity of the existing exception is 
undermined because facts can be proven by reliable, stored 
ESI. Both of these premises assume that there is a significant 
amount of ESI that is (or will soon be) over twenty years old 
and retrievable for use at trial. But is that assumption valid? 
There are many cases in which a party to litigation has moved 
for sanctions because their adversary has destroyed ESI.66 
Preservation orders and the duty to preserve ESI take up much 
of litigators’ time—time that would seem unnecessary if ESI 
was not routinely being destroyed (made irretrievable) 
pursuant to records management policies of countless 
businesses.67 Many organizations delete e-mails automatically 
after a certain amount of time unless they are specifically 
saved or archived.68 So why should we be worried about an 
onslaught of old ESI? And how can we assume that old reliable 
ESI will be readily available so that an ancient documents 
exception is unnecessary? 
In answering these questions, one must first separate out 
“lost” ESI from “deleted” ESI. An email is lost, for example, if 
the user did not delete it but simply cannot locate it through 
search options within her email account. But “lost” information 
like this is not destroyed and can be fairly easily retrieved. A 
Google search requesting “how to recover old emails” will 
produce step-by-step instructions for easy retrieval.69 So the 
focus for the question of “how much retrievable ESI is there?” is 
                                                
66  See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (seeking and obtaining sanctions after employees were instructed to 
destroy emails that were relevant to the plaintiff’s claims).  
67  For examples of disputes over records retention policies and preservation 
orders, see the materials in Chapter II of SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65. See also Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (describing document destruction that 
amounted to obstruction of justice when retention policy was suspiciously 
implemented). 
68  MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 98.  
69  See How to Access Old Emails, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_5070600 
_access-old-emails.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
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most importantly on information that has been deleted 
automatically (through a data management program) or by 
hand. 
Generally speaking, even after ESI is deleted, it is 
retrievable before it is overwritten.70 Retrieval becomes more 
difficult, however, when ESI is overwritten, or, when a new file 
takes the place of the old file on the hard drive.71 Many 
operating systems are likely to overwrite deleted data that is 
twenty years old.72 However, hundreds of software companies 
specialize in restoring deleted and overwritten data, even from 
computers that have been severely damaged. For example, 
Computer Checkup Premium offers a program specializing in 
undelete functions for only $39.95 per year.73 It is, in fact, 
questionable whether a standard records management system 
wipes its files completely simply by overwriting them. 
Certainly, the possibility of wiping a file becomes more and 
more unlikely as technology advances. For example, magnetic 
force microscopy (MFM) is a recently developed technique that 
makes it more difficult to wipe deleted data simply by 
overwriting it.74 Thus, there is a solid claim that even deleted 
                                                
70  See MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 120, 205; Why Deleted Files Can Be 
Recovered, HETMAN SOFTWARE, http://hetmanrecovery.com/recovery_news 
/why-deleted-files-can-be-recovered.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“If you 
run a data recovery tool in a timeframe when the file has been deleted but 
its disk space not yet used by another file, you will be able to get that file 
back. Of course, many things depend on what kind of a tool you’ll be 
using.”). 
71  See D Lamberti, How to Perform Hard Drive Recovery After Overwrite, 
BRIGHT HUB, http://www.brighthub.com/computing/hardware/articles/9442 
0.aspx (last updated Mar. 28, 2011) (“Whenever we store a document in a 
PC, and then store another document with the same name and in the 
same location of the disk, Windows alerts us, inquiring if we’re certain we 
want to overwrite the original document. If we choose Yes here, the 
original document is overwritten, and from that point going back to alter 
our choice is not possible.”). 
72 See Recover Lost Files and Deleted Emails, PARETO LOGIC, http://www 
.paretologic.com/products/datarecovery/pro/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014); see also Daniel Feenberg, Can Intelligence Agencies Read 
Overwritten Data?, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/sys-
admin/overwritten-data-guttman.html (stating that an attempt to retrieve 
overwritten data is likely to have an error rate). 
73  SHAREWARE CENTRAL, http://www.sharewarecentral.com/search.html?q=co 
mputer+checkup+premium (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
74  MFM “is a technique for imaging magnetization patterns with high 
resolution and minimal sample preparation. The technique is derived 
from scanning probe microscopy (SPM) and uses a sharp magnetic tip 
attached to a flexible cantilever placed close to the surface to be analyzed, 
where it interacts with the stray field emanating from the sample.” Peter 
Guttman, Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory, 
USENIX, http://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedings/ 
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ESI is reasonably accessible, and that claim gets stronger every 
day.75 On the other hand, it is fair to say that there will be 
some ESI that will be obtainable only through extraordinary 
efforts, such as information on an outdated program on an old 
hard-drive.76  
In addition to software that can recover overwritten data, it 
is now a common practice for data to be backed up in alternate 
locations, such as in cloud storage, even if it is deleted from a 
particular computer or server.77 Businesses and lawyers have 
discovered the importance of backing up old files.78 Computer 
forensic experts have found multiple ways to access cloud-
based email and other information. For example, with respect 
                                                                                                         
sec96/full_papers/gutmann/index.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2003). 
Because of developments such as MFM, examination of a disk with an 
electron microscope “can still reveal the previous contents of the wiped 
area, because the obliterating bytes are not written in exactly the same 
tracks as the original data . . . .” Id. 
75  See Clayton L. Barker & Philip W. Goodin, Discovery of Electronically 
Stored Information, 64 J. MO. B. 12, 15 (2008). In Lozoya v. Allphase 
Landscape Constr. Co., Civil Action No: 12-cv-1048-JLK, 2014 WL 222326 
(D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2014), the court found that information on the plaintiff’s 
computers could not be considered unavailable until a forensic expert fully 
examined the machines. The case suggests a distinct trend toward 
recognizing that retrieving old ESI is much less cumbersome or expensive 
than it once was. 
76  See Jack Halprin, Sarah M. Montgomery & Hon. David C. Norton, 
Preserving and Protecting: How to Handle Electronically Stored 
Information, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=YUQq-03-NUfI (noting that “extraordinary measures” may be 
necessary to get data off a very old hard drive). 
77  Use of virtual servers—cloud storage—is a “way to use the storage space 
and hardware on a computer or server efficiently to store more than one 
operating system or more than one server on the same physical device.” 
MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 102. Virtual systems have “become quite 
popular as a way to save energy, space, and resources in our ever-
expanding information universe.” Id.; see also MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, 
PROLIFERATION OF “ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION” (ESI) AND 
REIMBURSABLE PRIVATE CLOUD COMPUTING COSTS 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20110721073226_large.pdf. 
Storage in the cloud results in permanent retention. See The Lifespan of 
Storage Media, CRASHPLAN (2012), http://www.code42.com/crashplan 
/medialifespan. 
78 Cf. Wells Anderson, How to Protect Electronic Documents—From Yourself, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, June 2003, http://www.americanbar.org 
/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index
/protect.html (“In addition to a nightly backup routine, consider running a 
backup utility that operates continuously or periodically throughout the 
day, copying new and changed files to an alternative location such as 
another computer's local hard drive.”). The cost for a gigabyte of storage 
was $2,000,000 in 1956; in 2009 the cost was less than $1. Jason R. Baron 
& Ralph C. Losey, e-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M. 
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to email, messages “can be downloaded to a computer in 
Outlook, to applications that preserve the email from the cloud” 
and thus the emails are “reasonably accessible.”79 
Moreover, the very existence of spoliation disputes means 
that more and more ESI is now being preserved. The 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s e-
discovery rules have imposed duties to retain ESI.80 Preserving 
ESI is “important to companies that may ever be in a litigation 
or employment dispute, or that have to comply with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, PATRIOT 
Act, or other statutory or regulatory requirements. That’s 
virtually every public and private company of every size.”81  
The significance of the 2006 amendments “becomes even 
more striking when one considers that nearly ninety percent of 
U.S. corporations become engaged in lawsuits; and that at any 
one time, the average $1 billion company in the U.S. faces 147 
lawsuits.”82 As such, more and more ESI will be preserved due 
to retention obligations. 
But even if records retention programs do not prevent the 
mass deletion of ESI by organizations, and even assuming that 
the ESI cannot be retrieved through reasonable efforts once 
deleted, there would remain many reasons to be concerned 
about overuse of the ancient documents exception as applied to 
ESI. For one thing, much of the ESI that is relevant to 
litigation is not generated by organizations with records 
management programs. Rather, it is generated by individuals 
in the form of personal emails, Tweets, Facebook posts, text 
messages, chat room dialog, voice mails, and on and on.83 Much 
of this information is unlikely to be deleted by individuals, and 
even if it is, the ESI will often be available from others who had 
access to the information (such as the recipients of the Tweet, 
                                                
79 Joshua Gilliland, Nitty Gritty Discovery Requests, BOW TIE LAW’S BLOG 
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/nitty-gritty-
discovery-requests. 
80 See generally Richard P. Marcus, The 2006 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information: Fitting Electronic Discovery into the Overall Discovery Mix, 
in SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 1-17. 
81 Linda Volonino, Janice C. Sipior & Burke T. Ward, Managing the Lifecycle 
of Electronically Stored Information, 24 INFO SYSTEMS MGMT. 231, 232 
(2007). 
82  Id. 
83  Professor Jeffrey Bellin has documented the increased use in litigation of 
ESI generated by individuals in their personal lives. See, e.g., Jeffrey 
Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. Rev. 7 (2013); Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, 
Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 331 (2012). 
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or the third-party provider).84 These personal assertions will 
often be made without any verification at all—a Facebook post 
in the privacy of one’s own home, for example—so there is 
reason to be concerned about their reliability. That concern is 
not at all alleviated by the fact that the assertion is old.  
Second, web postings are preserved for posterity by the 
Internet Archive. Indeed, the express goal of the Internet 
Archive is to “prevent the Internet . . . and other ‘born-digital’ 
materials from disappearing into the past.”85 Thus, records 
management programs do nothing to alleviate the threat of 
overuse of the ancient documents exception as applied to the 
overwhelming amount of information that is posted on the 
web.86 The same can be said for other types of ESI. For 
example, the Google library project estimates that there are 
nearly 130 million books,87 and it has so far digitized over 20 
million of them, most of which are old and out of print. These 
books are now easily accessible, with many more to come.88 
That means assertions of fact in those books are automatically 
admissible under the ancient documents exception so long as 
the books are more than twenty years old. 
                                                
84 See, e.g., Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between 
“Friends”?, BOSTON B. J. (2009) (noting that Facebook posts can be 
obtained from the computers of any participant in a Facebook 
conversation, or “from Facebook itself”); Biz Stone, Tweet Preservation, 
TWITTER BLOGS (Apr. 14, 2010) http://blog.twitter.com/2010/04/tweet 
.preservation.html (stating that Twitter is now donating “access to the 
entire archive of public Tweets to the Library of Congress for preservation 
and research”).  
85 About the Internet Archive, THE INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/ 
about (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
86 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2001) 
(“[A]lmost everything on the Internet is being archived . . . . We are 
accustomed to information on the web quickly flickering in and out of 
existence, presenting the illusion that it is ephemeral. But little on the 
Internet disappears or is forgotten, even when we delete or change the 
information.”). 
87 Ben Parr, Google: There Are 129,864,880 Books in the Entire World, 
MASHABLE, Aug. 5, 2010, http://mashable.com/2010/08/05/number-of-books 
-in-the-world. 
88 Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, Siding with Google, Judge Says Book 
Search Does Not Infringe Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/business/media/judge-sides-with-goog 
le-on-book-scanning-suit.html. In November 2013, Judge Chin, sitting by 
designation in the S.D.N.Y, paved the way for Google to continue 
digitizing these books despite copyright objections by ruling that the 
digitization constituted “fair use” under the copyright laws. Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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Finally, it is important to remember that the concern about 
deletion of ESI in the case law arises in the context of 
spoliation claims. That is, a party is complaining that its 
opponent deleted ESI that was unfavorable to the opponent’s 
position. But that kind of ESI, were it preserved and in fact 
unfavorable, would be admissible against the record-keeper 
over a hearsay objection as party-opponent statements.89 
Consequently, there is a litigation-based incentive to delete it 
(if you can get away with it). But the problem posed by ESI 
with respect to the ancient documents exception is that the 
record-keeper would have an incentive to keep information that 
is favorable to its position. It will not matter whether that 
information is reliable. Indeed there will be an incentive to 
keep self-serving, unreliable accounts as ESI because the cost 
of preserving that information will be so low. 
In sum, the fact that some or even much of the world’s ESI 
is deleted will do little to prevent overuse of the ancient 
documents exception as applied to ESI.90 
B. Does the Ancient Documents Exception Even 
Apply to ESI? 
ESI that is stored for twenty years is not like a magazine 
sitting in the attic for twenty years. Electronic data is dynamic. 
It is changed, at least in some ways, by the action of accessing 
it, viewing it, or moving it. “[N]onapparent information that 
                                                
89  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
90  One might wonder whether information on digital media might simply 
degrade without any attempt to destroy it. Crashplan, an organization 
that specializes in managing and protecting customers’ digital data, 
created an infographic showing the expected lifespans of various types of 
storage mediums. Out of the twenty-five types of storage mediums 
analyzed, ten of them are expected to last longer than twenty years under 
conditions of regular use. Among the most resilient are the more modern 
technologies, such as memory cards and hard drives. However, some 
extremely old technologies such as Super 8 Film (created in 1965) and 
Vinyl Records (created in the late 1800s) can last for extremely long 
periods—seventy years of regular use for Super 8 Films, and one hundred 
years for Vinyl Records. Moreover, the number of storage mediums able to 
last over twenty years increases significantly if the medium remains 
unused or under appropriate care, as is likely to be the case if the medium 
is used for archival purposes. Of the twenty-five types of storage mediums 
analyzed, twenty of them are expected to last twenty years or longer if 
used for archival purposes (and cared for as such). See CRASHPLAN, The 
Lifespan of Storage Media (2012), http://www.code42.com/crashplan/ 
medialifespan. Some Blu-Ray discs purport to be able to last essentially 
forever. The M-Disc claims that “once [data] is written [on the disc], your 
documents, medical records, photos, videos and data will last up to 1,000 
years.” What is M-Disc?, M-DISC, http://www.mdisc.com/what-is-mdisc 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
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can become part of the electronic data is called metadata.”91 
The dynamic nature of ESI might seem to be an ill fit for an 
ancient documents exception if it is thought to be grounded in 
the authenticity that comes from a document being in “a place” 
where it would “likely be.”92 There would be no worry about the 
ancient documents hearsay exception if old ESI could not be 
authenticated due to its dynamic nature—because, as stated 
above, authenticity is the requirement for satisfying the 
hearsay rule under Rule 803(16). 
In fact, the dynamic nature of stored ESI will not raise a 
substantial bar to the use of the ancient documents hearsay 
exception. This is so for a number of reasons. First, Rule 
901(b)(8) specifically contemplates that the age of an electronic 
document will provide a ground of authenticity for ESI. That 
rule covers “data compilation” in any form. If the mere fact that 
an electronic document was changed in some immaterial 
respect due to storage were enough to disqualify that document 
from being found authentic under Rule 901(b)(8), then the 
drafters would not have covered data compilations in that rule. 
It makes no sense to write a rule of authenticity that covers 
information that is per se disqualified from being authenticated 
under that rule. True, it is probably fair to state that none of 
the original Advisory Committee members were experts on the 
technicalities of storage of electronic information. But they 
could certainly be expected to know, even then, that electronic 
information was not stored in the same way as a magazine or 
library book. Thus, the specific inclusion of data compilations 
                                                
91 MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 17. For a discussion of metadata, see 
SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 356-382. 
It should be noted that system metadata—information about an electronic 
file that is generated by a computer without human input—is not hearsay 
and so would present no concerns for the ancient document exception or 
any other exception to the hearsay rule. This is because system metadata 
is machine-generated and a machine is not a “declarant” who makes a 
“statement” within the meaning of the hearsay rule. United States v. 
Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008) (printout from gas chromatograph is 
not hearsay); United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(header information accompanying an image file was not hearsay because 
it was automatically generated). On the other hand, application 
metadata—including such information as spreadsheet formula or redline 
changes in word processing documents—is the result of human input and 
so “may constitute hearsay, just as any other ‘statement’ made by a 
human being.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 10 (Kevin F. Brady et al. 
eds., 2008). Consequently, the existence of application data in old ESI 
further raises the risk of overuse of the ancient documents exception to 
the hearsay rule. 
92 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8). 
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in Rule 901(b)(8) is a clear indication that the dynamic nature 
of ESI storage does not per se disqualify it from authentication 
under Rule 901(b)(8), and therefore does not disqualify the 
contents from automatic admissibility under Rule 803(16). 
Moreover, the best reading of the language of Rule 901(b)(8) 
covers old ESI even if it has been accessed, viewed, or so on 
over a twenty-year period. This is because if ESI is found on a 
server, hard drive, cloud, etc., it really is in a “place” where it 
would “likely be.” Nothing in Rule 901(b)(8) requires a 
document to have been placed in a hermetically sealed and 
immovable container for twenty years; nothing in the Rule 
prohibits authenticating a document that has been viewed, 
accessed, or moved repeatedly over twenty years, so long as it 
is found in a place where it would likely be. So if a frequently 
read or moved magazine can be authenticated as an ancient 
document, there is every reason to give the same basic 
treatment to frequently accessed, viewed or moved ESI. 
But even if Rule 901(b)(8) were found inapplicable to 
authenticate ESI that had been accessed, viewed, or moved, 
that would not deter the admissibility of old ESI under the 
ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(16) 
operates as an exception for a more-than-twenty-year-old 
document whenever that document is found authentic on any 
ground. It does not require a finding of authenticity under Rule 
901(b)(8). Thus, just like new ESI, old ESI can be 
authenticated in any number of ways, as indicated by the 
scores of cases involving challenges to the authenticity of ESI.93 
It must be remembered that the threshold for the court’s 
determination of authenticity under Rule 901 is not high: “the 
court need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the 
proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that 
the jury ultimately might do so.”94 The possibility of alteration 
“[is] not and cannot be the basis for excluding ESI as 
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more that it can be 
the rationale for excluding paper documents.”95 
The following is a non-inclusive list of possibilities for 
authenticating old ESI by means other than Rule 901(b)(8): 
●  ESI of various types can be authenticated by 
distinctive characteristics and circumstantial 
evidence under Rule 901(b)(4).96 
                                                
93 For a general discussion about authenticating ESI, see SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA 
& THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 754-67. 
94 United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006). 
95 Id. at 40. 
96  See, e.g., United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2012) 
 
 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 17 
 
28 
●  Any public record, including data compilations by a 
public office, can be authenticated under Rule 
901(b)(7), upon a showing that the record is from 
“the office where items of this kind are kept.” There 
is no requirement that the records be reliable to be 
admissible.97 Thus when an old public record is 
authenticated under Rule 901(b)(7), all the 
assertions in the record are admissible for their 
truth even though they would not be trustworthy 
enough to be admissible under the hearsay exception 
for public records.98 That is, the ancient documents 
exception renders the limits of the public records 
exception irrelevant for all of the digital data of the 
government that is more than twenty years old.  
●  Under Rule 901(b)(9), ESI can be authenticated 
when the proponent provides enough information for 
a reasonable person to find that the electronic data 
is the product of a system that “produces an accurate 
result.”99 Again, “accurate” does not refer to the 
reliability of assertions in the document, only that 
the output is not substantially changed from the 
input.100  
●  Under Rule 902(5), official publications of a public 
authority, including website content, are self-
authenticating—no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity is required.101 
                                                                                                         
(finding text messages to be properly authenticated by circumstantial 
evidence: specifically, that the defendant, when arrested, was texting and 
phoning the victim); Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 39-42 (noting that “@” 
symbol and email addresses are distinctive characteristics sufficient for 
authentication). 
97  See, e.g., United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(“Any question as to the accuracy of the printouts, whether resulting from 
incorrect data entry or the operation of the computer program, as with 
inaccuracies in any other type of business records, would have affected 
only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility.”) (quoting United 
States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
98  FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (requiring exclusion if the opponent shows that the 
source of information or other circumstances indicates a lack of 
trustworthiness). 
99  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).  
100 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(establishing the reliability of computer read-out of electronic forensic 
analysis of defendant’s blood sample for drug and alcohol content by 
showing that the machine and functions are reliable, that it was correctly 
adjusted or calibrated, and that the data put into the machine was 
accurate).  
101 See, e.g., Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689-90 (D. Md. 2008) 
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●  Websites can be authenticated by presenting 
information from the “Wayback Machine.”102 
●  Testimony of a witness with personal knowledge 
about the ESI that is presented to the court can 
often be sufficient evidence of authenticity.103  
●  Posts on Facebook, YouTube, and other account-
based social media can be authenticated not only by 
distinctive characteristics but also by the 
demonstration of use of passwords and email 
addresses.104 
● Temporary Internet files, even if deleted, can be 
authenticated by the forensic expert who retrieved 
them.105 
In sum, there are myriad ways to authenticate ESI that 
certainly apply to ESI more than twenty years old, even if 
authentication as an ancient document were not possible under 
Rule 901(b)(8).106 Consequently, the risk is real that the 
                                                                                                         
(finding printed copies of state agencies’ websites to be self-
authenticating). 
102 See, e.g., Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (approving the use 
of the Internet Archive’s “wayback machine” to authenticate websites as 
they appeared on various dates relevant to the litigation). 
103 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); see, e.g., Buzz Off Insect Shield LLC v. S.C. 
Johnson, 606 F. Supp. 2d 571, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (authenticating 
website where witness testified that he typed a URL, logged onto and 
viewed the site, and that the printout offered at trial fairly reflected what 
she saw); Adamah v. Tayson, No. 09-CV-5477 (FB), 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
54172, at *9 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010) (allowing testimony of 
participant to an exchange of texts to establish authenticity).  
104 See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding 
that trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting against two 
defendants Facebook pages and videos hosted on YouTube and 
maintained by Google because the Facebook pages were captured as 
screenshots and displayed the defendants’ user profiles and postings; the 
screenshots included photos and links to the YouTube videos; the 
defendants had posted their personal biographical information on the 
Facebook pages along with quotations and listings of their interests; each 
Facebook page contained a section for postings from other users; and the 
prosecution had satisfied its low burden of establishing authenticity under 
Rule 901(a) by tracking the Facebook pages and Facebook accounts to 
Hassan’s and Yaghi’s email addresses). 
105 United States v. Johnson, No. 04-CR-12-LRR, 206 WL 2548913, at *3-5 
(N.D. Iowa Aug. 31, 2006). 
106 This is not to say that all ESI, whether new or old, will automatically be 
found authentic. Certain types of ESI present thorny problems of 
authentication. For example, database information presents challenges 
because it is not just a stand-alone document sitting in a server, but 
rather constitutes an amalgamation of separate data elements. Certainly 
there will be special problems in establishing authenticity for this 
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ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule—simply 
equating authenticity with admissibility of hearsay—will 
become an open door to admitting unreliable hearsay in vast 
amounts of old ESI.  
C. No Existing Problem to Address? 
Another possible argument against amending the ancient 
documents exception as applied to ESI is that it is not affecting 
the courts at this point in time. One searches in vain for a 
reported case addressing admissibility of ESI under the ancient 
documents exception. While this of course does not mean that 
ESI has never been offered under Rule 803(16), it is surely a 
rough indication that the problem of using the ancient 
documents exception to admit unreliable ESI is not currently 
widespread.  
As discussed above, the Advisory Committee does not 
propose an amendment to the Rules of Evidence unless the 
amendment would solve a real problem, so it might be argued 
that amending Rule 803(16) due to a projected but not-yet-
existing onslaught of old ESI is inappropriate. The 
counterargument is that technology and the use of technology 
at trials develops very quickly. Trying to keep up with these 
changes is very difficult in the context of the deliberate nature 
of the rulemaking process. Enacting an amendment to the 
national rules of procedure takes a minimum of three years.107 
Given all the ESI that will become potentially admissible 
without regard to reliability under Rule 803(16) in the next 
three or four years, it behooves the rulemakers to get out ahead 
of the curve. It would of course not be completely unreasonable 
to wait for the problem to rear its head in the courts. The 
consequence of waiting is not that the rule would lag behind 
                                                                                                         
amalgamated information; and as to ancient documents, there may be 
some difficulty in determining whether the amalgamated information is in 
a place where it would most likely be. See generally THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DATABASE PRINCIPLES: 
ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF DATABASES AND 
DATABASE INFORMATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION (David J. Kessler et. al eds., 
2011). Additionally, there may be difficulty in determining the author of 
certain ESI if it comes from different sources, such as a dashboard in a 
corporate intranet. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON ESI 
EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY, supra note 91, at 12. But the instances 
demonstrated in text, both under Rule 901(b)(8) and other rules of 
authentication, definitely indicate a risk that much ESI will be admissible 
for its truth simply because it is pretty easily authenticated. 
107 The rulemaking process and its deliberate pace are described well by 
Peter G. McCabe in Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1655, 1671-76 (1995). 
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emerging technology, but simply that unreliable hearsay may 
well be admitted en masse for a few years. The Republic will 
survive. Nonetheless, it is possible to avoid that problem, or at 
least to have a change to the ancient documents exception on 
the rulemaking radar so that any damage caused by admitting 
unreliable hearsay can be limited. 
D. Can the Problem of Unreliable Old ESI Be 
Handled By Use of Rule 403? 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a court may 
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” It might 
be argued that amending Rule 803(16) to prevent admission of 
unreliable ESI is not necessary because a court presented with 
old unreliable ESI can and will exclude it under Rule 403. The 
argument would be that unreliable old ESI is not “probative” 
and will mislead the jury. But there are at least three reasons 
why Rule 403 will not be as effective as the direct approach of 
amending Rule 803(16) to close the loophole for unreliable ESI.  
The first and most important reason is that when a court 
assesses the probative value of a proffered statement, it does 
not consider the reliability of that statement. As many courts 
have recognized, “Rule 403 is not to be used to exclude 
testimony that a trial judge does not find credible.”108 Rather, 
“[w]eighing probative value against unfair prejudice under 
[Rule 403] means probative value with respect to a material 
fact if the evidence is believed, not the degree the court finds it 
believable.”109 Take a case in which the defendant is charged 
with a “cold case” murder and the government offers a text 
message from a drug addict who says he saw the murder on the 
                                                
108 E.g., Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 876 (10th Cir. 2009); see also 
Western Indus. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 
1984) (finding that the trial court erred in excluding statements because it 
did not believe the witness who made them). 
109 Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282, 284 (1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis added); 
see also Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that the district court erred in excluding blood test results under 
Rule 403 because it found the test to not be “credible” or “reliable”). In 
Ballou, the Fifth Circuit explained that “Rule 403 does not permit 
exclusion of evidence because the judge does not find it credible” and that, 
when applying Rule 403, district courts should “determine[] the probative 
value of the test results if true, and weigh[] that probative value against 
the danger of unfair prejudice, leaving to the jury the difficult choice of 
whether to credit the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 
615 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
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way back from his LSD dealer; or a disgruntled employee who, 
having been fired for stealing from his employer, sends a Tweet 
falsely stating that the employer is dumping toxic waste. Even 
if those electronic communications are patently unreliable 
hearsay, they cannot be excluded under Rule 403 because they 
are very probative of the facts related if believed. In other 
words, once the hearsay is found admissible under a hearsay 
exception, the judge cannot exclude it under Rule 403. 
Unreliable hearsay has to be excluded under the hearsay rule 
or not at all.  
It may seem anomalous that such unreliable evidence can, 
and indeed must, be admitted insofar as Rule 403 is 
concerned,110 but the result is understandable in light of the 
different roles played by different evidence rules. With respect 
to out-of-court statements offered for their truth, it is the 
hearsay rule that screens for reliability, and if the statement 
fits the hearsay exception, the Federal Rules are done 
regulating its reliability; reliability then becomes a question of 
weight for the fact finder.111 The problem with old ESI is that 
the ancient documents exception fails in the mission of the 
hearsay rule.112 
                                                
110 Rule 403 does have a role to play if a statement is offered for a non-
hearsay purpose but the jury could misuse it for its truth. That risk of 
misuse constitutes prejudicial effect, which must be balanced against the 
probative value of the statement as to the not-for-truth purpose. See, e.g., 
United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a statement 
accusing the defendant of criminal conduct offered to prove the 
“background” of the police investigation should have been excluded 
because its probative value in proving “background” was substantially 
outweighed by the risk that the jury would use the statement as proof of 
the defendant’s criminal conduct, i.e., for its truth). But if the statement is 
properly admitted under a hearsay exception, and therefore can be used 
as proof of the fact asserted, then Rule 403 may not be used to exclude it 
on reliability grounds. 
111 See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(finding that a statement that fit the requirements of a hearsay exception 
could not be excluded even though the trial judge found it to be 
untrustworthy: “False it may well have been but if it fell within [the 
exception], as it clearly did if the words of that Rule are read to mean 
what they say, its truth or falsity was for the jury to determine.”). 
112 Notably, there are existing cases finding that ancient hardcopy is 
admissible even if unreliable, and these cases do not resort to a Rule 403 
analysis to exclude the unreliable evidence. See, e.g., George v. Celotex 
Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that, if a document is 
authenticated as an ancient document, lack of trustworthiness is a matter 
of weight and not admissibility, as Rule 803(16) contains no independent 
requirement of trustworthiness); Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274 
(M.D. Fla. 1984) (finding newspaper articles more than twenty years old 
admissible for their truth without an independent showing of reliability, 
while newspapers less than twenty years old were excluded). 
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Second, even if Rule 403 could somehow be used to screen 
out unreliable old ESI that would otherwise be admissible 
under the ancient documents hearsay exception, the balancing 
test of Rule 403 is geared heavily toward admissibility—the 
prejudicial effect must substantially outweigh the probative 
value for evidence to be excluded. As the courts have said, the 
trial court’s power to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be 
invoked “sparingly.”113 Because exclusion is essentially saved 
for egregious cases, Rule 403 could not be expected—even if it 
were applicable—to be an effective device to exclude all 
unreliable old ESI. 
Finally, it goes without saying that a Rule 403 balancing is 
heavily case-dependent and highly discretionary.114 That case-
by-case approach—even assuming Rule 403 could be applied—
is bound to be less effective than a rule that either prohibits old 
ESI or at least conditions admissibility on a finding of 
necessity. For all these reasons, Rule 403 is not the solution to 
the problem of unreliable ESI being admitted for the truth of 
its contents under the ancient documents hearsay exception.  
E. Ancient Hardcopy Documents Might Still Be 
Necessary in Some Litigation 
A final argument in response to amending the ancient 
documents hearsay exception is a cautionary one. Even if old 
ESI is preserved and accessible, there will still be some cases in 
which the only evidence available is old hardcopy. For example, 
cases involving immigration violations for fraudulent entry into 
the country often must be proven by old hardcopy found in 
some archive.115 Courts have also admitted old hardcopy in 
asbestos cases, CERCLA cases, property disputes, and stolen 
art cases, among others.116 
                                                
113 Herrington v. Hiller, 883 F.3d 411, 414 (1989); see also Dartez v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[B]ecause Rule 403 
permits the exclusion of probative evidence it is an extraordinary remedy 
that must be used sparingly.”).  
114 See, e.g., Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1332 (6th Cir. 
1994) (noting that Rule 403 rulings are highly discretionary and appellate 
courts often affirm Rule 403 decisions “either way” they come out). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that records of Nazi activity during World War II made defendant 
ineligible for a visa). 
116 E.g., Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d at 29-30 (finding that a report showing that 
a study of asbestos plants was prepared in 1947 was evidence that the 
company knew about asbestos risk); In re Paysage Bords de Seine, 991 F. 
Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2014) (using old museum records in a case about 
ownership of a work of art); Tremont LLC v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (admitting old records 
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In none of the above-cited cases was there ESI (let alone 
reliable ESI) available to prove what the hardcopies were 
offered to prove. Accordingly, one could argue that even if an 
amendment were necessary to regulate old ESI, any 
amendment should preserve the exception in cases where 
necessity can be shown. Put another way, even though the 
rationale of the ancient documents exception is questionable 
because necessity trumps reliability, that rationale may still be 
applicable to certain actions today, despite the development of 
ESI. One of the drafting alternatives below provides for a 
necessity carve-out.  
IV. DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES 
The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee should 
amend Rule 803(16) in order to prevent the admission of 
terabytes of old and unreliable ESI. In this Part, I will propose 
several modifications to the Rule that, if adopted, would reduce 
or eliminate the problems described above.  
A. Deletion 
One alternative is simply to delete Rule 803(16). As stated 
above, the basic problem with the rule is that it confuses the 
authenticity of a document with the reliability of its contents. 
It simply does not follow that because a document is genuine, 
the statements in the document are reliable. One could argue 
that necessity alone cannot justify the use of unreliable 
evidence and that any hearsay statement that is old and that 
should be admissible (because it is reliable) can be offered 
under the residual exception to the hearsay rule117—you do not 
need an ancient documents exception to admit old but reliable 
evidence. Indeed the only case cited by the Advisory Committee 
in support of Rule 803(16) was one in which the court found an 
old document admissible not because it was an ancient 
document, but rather because it carried the circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness that would support admission 
today under the residual exception.118  
How would deletion be implemented? The rulemaking 
formula in such a situation is to delete the text, keep the rule 
                                                                                                         
indicating disposal of waste in a CERCLA case under Rule 803(16)); 
Koepp v. Holland, 688 F. Supp. 2d 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (admitting old deed 
as an ancient document in a property dispute). 
117 FED. R. EVID. 807 (establishing a hearsay exception for statements having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the hearsay 
exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 804). 
118 See FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note (citing Dallas County 
v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
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number open (so as not to upset electronic searches relying on 
existing rule numbers), and provide a committee note 
explaining the motivation for the deletion. Thus, the deletion 
would look something like this: 
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A 
statement in a document that is at least 20 years 
old and whose authenticity is established. 
[Abrogated]. 
And here is a possible Committee Note for the abrogation: 
Committee Note. The ancient documents 
exception to the rule against hearsay has been 
abrogated. The exception was based on the 
premise that the contents of a document are 
reliable merely because the document is old. 
While it is appropriate to conclude that a 
document is genuine when it is old and located in 
a place where it would likely be—see Rule 
901(b)(8)—it does not follow that the contents of 
such a document are truthful.  
The ancient documents exception could 
once have been thought appropriate out of 
necessity due to the unavailability of other proof 
for old disputes and because the exception has 
been so rarely invoked. However, given the 
development and growth in quantity of 
electronically stored information, the exception 
has become less justifiable and subject to greater 
abuse. The need for an ancient document rule 
that does not qualify under any other hearsay 
exception has been diminished by the fact that 
reliable electronic information is likely to be 
available and can be used as proof under a 
number of hearsay exceptions. Abuse of the 
ancient document exception is possible because 
unreliable electronic information may be 
widespread and would be admissible under the 
exception simply because it has been preserved 
in a database for twenty years.  
One possible problem with abrogation is that it is a radical 
remedy in the context of the rulemaking process. No rule of 
evidence has been abrogated in the forty-year history of the 
Rules. Abrogation of Rule 803(16) is especially problematic 
because it would not only be based on changed circumstances, 
but would also be a concession that the original Advisory 
Committee (and the common law) was wrong in equating 
authenticity of a document with the reliability of statements in 
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the document. Moreover, the Advisory Committee has been 
especially wary about limiting hearsay exceptions and 
exemptions. The hearsay exceptions and exemptions have been 
amended on only four occasions since 1975. Only one of those 
amendments narrowed the coverage of a hearsay exception.119 
The others expanded an exception’s or exemption’s coverage.120 
Just recently, the Advisory Committee rejected calls to 
abrogate the hearsay exceptions for present sense impressions 
and excited utterances, the charge being that these exceptions 
were ill-conceived from the beginning.121 A total rejection of the 
ancient documents exception, even though supportable on the 
merits, thus creates some tension with the careful approach—
and respect for the original Advisory Committee—of the 
rulemakers.  
The remaining proposals consider ways to limit the risk of 
overuse of the ancient documents exception especially as 
applied to ESI, without the facially drastic remedy of 
abrogation.  
                                                
119 Rule 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010 to require the prosecution to show 
corroborating circumstances indicating trustworthiness before a 
declaration against penal interest can be admitted against a criminal 
defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 
amendment. 
120 Rule 801(d)(2), the hearsay exemption for statements made by agents of a 
party-opponent, was amended in 1997 to allow a proponent to establish its 
burden of showing agency by offering the hearsay statement itself 
together with some independent evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) 
advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment. Rule 803(6), the business 
records exception, was amended in 2000 to allow the foundation 
requirements to be proved by a certificate rather than by testimony of a 
foundation witness. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 
2000 amendment. Amendments to Rules 803(6)-(8) that took effect on 
December 1, 2014 clarify that once the foundational requirements of those 
exceptions are met, it is the opponent’s burden to show that the 
preparation or other circumstances indicate untrustworthiness. FED. R. 
EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. Finally, an 
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the hearsay exemption for prior 
consistent statements, that also took effect December 1, 2014 expands the 
exemption to allow any consistent statement to be admitted for its truth if 
it is properly admissible to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility. FED. R. 
EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. 
121 The suggestion for abrogating these exceptions—Rules 803(1) and (2), was 
made by Judge Posner in his concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce, 
742 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014). The Advisory Committee rejected the 
proposal because members were not convinced that the exceptions were 
without merit and were concerned that the abrogation of two important 
exceptions to the hearsay rule would be a radical remedy. See Minutes of 
the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 5, Mar. 2014 (on file 
with author). 
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B. Limit the Exception to Hardcopy Documents 
One possible reason for limiting the exception to hardcopy 
documents, as discussed above, is that the ancient documents 
exception may be thought to continue to play a useful role in 
certain kinds of litigation in which critical hardcopy documents 
are very old and impossible to qualify under other exceptions. 
An amendment with this thought in mind would look as 
follows: 
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A 
statement in a document—but not including 
information that is electronically stored—that is 
at least 20 years old and whose authenticity is 
established.  
The major problem with an amendment that carves out 
electronic information is that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
have a rule that equates electronic evidence with hardcopy. 
Rule 101(b)(6), which became effective on December 1, 2011, 
provides that “a reference to any kind of written material or 
any other medium includes electronically stored 
information.”122 Rule 101(b)(6) was added as part of the 
Restyling Project,123 one of the goals of which was to clarify 
that while the original Rules of Evidence were written largely 
with hardcopy in mind, the evidentiary concepts established in 
the Rules were and remain equally applicable to ESI. Instead 
of specifying that equation in every single hardcopy-based rule, 
the decision was made to use an all-encompassing definitional 
approach.124 
Carving out ESI from 803(16) is inconsistent with the basic 
approach to ESI so recently taken in the Restyling Project. It is 
questionable whether a deviation from a unified approach is 
justified simply to allow old—and often unreliable—hardcopy 
to be admitted in a handful of CERCLA and deportation cases. 
Given the fundamental flaw in the ancient documents 
exception, it is probably not worth retaining it in its present 
form while limiting it to hardcopy. Moreover, there still could 
be a random case in which the only available proof of an old 
matter is ESI that is not admissible under other exceptions. 
There would seem to be no reason to treat that case differently 
from one where the only available proof is hardcopy.  
                                                
122 FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6). 
123 For a description of the Restyling Project and its goals, see Committee 
Note to amendment to the 2011 amendment to Rule 101, in DANIEL J. 
CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 7 (2014-15 ed. 2014). 
124 See CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 123, at 10. 
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If, however, ESI were to be carved out from the ancient 
documents exception, the Committee Note to such an 
amendment should explain the conflict between the carve-out 
and the general approach to the Evidence Rules in equating 
hardcopy and ESI. That Committee Note might look something 
like this: 
Committee Note. The ancient documents 
exception to the rule against hearsay has been 
amended to specify that it is not applicable to 
information that is electronically stored. The 
ancient documents exception remains necessary 
for certain kinds of litigation in which 
information is located only in hardcopy 
documents that have withstood the test of time. 
However, the exception is subject to abuse when 
applied to electronically stored information. The 
need for old electronically stored information 
that does not qualify under any other hearsay 
exception is diminished by the fact that reliable 
electronic information is likely to be preserved 
and could be used as proof under a hearsay 
exception that guarantees reliability—e.g., Rule 
803(6), Rule 807. Abuse is possible because 
unreliable electronic information may be 
widespread and would be admissible under the 
exception simply because it has been preserved 
for twenty years.  
The amendment provides an exception to 
the general definition in Rule 101(b)(6), under 
which a reference to any kind of writing includes 
electronically stored information. Nothing in the 
amendment is intended to undermine any other 
use of electronically stored information under 
these Rules.  
C. Add a Necessity Requirement 
A third option is to apply the ancient documents exception 
to both ESI and hardcopy equally, but to limit the exception to 
situations in which the initial justification still exists—in other 
words, where it is necessary to introduce the old evidence 
because there are no reasonably available alternatives. That 
amendment might look like this: 
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A 
statement in a document that is at least 20 years 
old if:  
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(A) and whose the document’s authenticity is 
established; and  
(B) the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain 
through reasonable efforts. 
The language in new subdivision (B) is taken directly from 
the residual exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 807. That 
language was intended to limit the use of the residual hearsay 
exception to cases where it was truly necessary.125 That same 
reasoning should apply to the ancient documents exception: if 
other evidence admissible under other reliability-based 
exceptions could be obtained through reasonable efforts, then 
the ancient documents exception should not be used either for 
hardcopy or ESI. Essentially, the proposal ties the exception to 
its only real (albeit weak) reason for being.  
Adding the “more probative” requirement to Rule 803(16) 
would have a substantial ameliorative effect on the potential 
abuses raised by ESI. As discussed above, in any case in which 
there is old ESI available, there is likely to be reliable ESI that 
could be admitted to prove a point. It is otherwise simply bad 
practice to allow a proponent to admit unreliable ESI just 
because it is old.  
The added advantage of tracking the “more probative” 
language from the residual exception is that there is case law 
that can and should be borrowed from Rule 807 on what 
constitutes “reasonable efforts” to obtain information 
admissible under other exceptions. The case law under Rule 
807 indicates that a proponent must try to find alternative 
evidence, but need not undertake Herculean efforts to do so.126 
“[L]imitations upon the financial resources available to the 
parties and the court are rightfully considered.”127 As one court 
put it, whether equally probative evidence is reasonably 
available depends upon “the importance of the evidence, the 
means at the command of the proponent, and the amount in 
controversy.”128 Thus, as applied to ESI and the ancient 
documents exception, old ESI might be admissible if 
                                                
125 See SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 22, § 807.02[5] (explaining 
that the rationale for the “more probative” requirement “is that the 
residual exception should be reserved for cases of clear necessity”). 
126 See the cases cited in SALTZBURG, MARTIN AND CAPRA, supra note 22, §§ 
807.17-807.21. 
127 Id. § 807.11. 
128 Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1552 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
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alternative ESI can only be found by expensive forensic efforts 
or could only be read only by obtaining software that is not 
easily available. 
One might ask: If you are going to add a necessity 
requirement from Rule 807, then why not add the reliability 
requirement from Rule 807 as well? The answer is that there 
would then be another Rule 807—there need not be two of 
them. The additional necessity-based language would limit the 
exception to its original rationale and it would make it much 
less likely that the exception would become a broad avenue of 
admissibility for questionably reliable ESI because, in most 
cases, there is likely to be reliable ESI that can be admitted 
under other exceptions. 
Here is a possible Committee Note explaining the addition 
of a “more probative” requirement to Rule 803(16):  
Committee Note. Rule 803(16) has been 
amended to require a specific showing of 
necessity before hearsay may be admitted under 
the ancient document exception. See Rule 807 
(imposing an identical necessity requirement). 
Unlike the other hearsay exceptions, Rule 
803(16) imposes no requirement that the hearsay 
in a document be reliable. The basic justification 
for the exception is necessity, but the text of the 
existing Rule does not, in fact, require the 
proponent to show that there is no other way to 
prove the point for which the hearsay is offered. 
The absence of a necessity requirement is 
particularly troubling given the development and 
widespread use of electronically stored 
information. Without a necessity requirement, a 
proponent might use the ancient documents 
exception to admit unreliable ESI or hardcopy, 
even though reliable evidence may be readily 
available.  
The language added to the Rule is 
intentionally chosen so that guidance from case 
law under Rule 807 can be used to interpret the 
identical language in Rule 803(16).  
Of course, the necessity-based solution suffers from the 
fundamental flaw from which the ancient documents exception 
has always suffered: the unsupportable equation of 
authenticity and reliability. Essentially, the exception, as 
amended by the necessity language, would say that unreliable 
hearsay can be admitted when it is necessary to prove a point. 
That is logically problematic, but at least the addition of 
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necessity-based language will put the exception back where it 
always was—as a backwater in the hearsay rule. It will limit 
the damage that will occur from what would otherwise be 
wholesale admission of unreliable ESI, and it responds to the 
Advisory Committee’s understandable reluctance to abrogate 
hearsay exceptions where the ground for the amendment is 
that the exception was wrong from the start.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule should 
be changed before litigants find out that it is an open door to 
admitting old and unreliable ESI as evidence. Academic purity 
would suggest that the exception should be abrogated because 
it did not make sense in the first place. But a compromise 
approach—specific language limiting the exception to the 
necessity-basis on which it has always been implicitly 
grounded—will serve to prevent overuse of the exception as 
applied to ESI without the jarring effect of totally eliminating a 
traditional exception to the hearsay rule. 
